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Abstract 
 
We use the die-paradigm to study gender differences in cheating behavior. We find that 
i) both males and females do not cheat in the absence of financial incentives, ii) both 
males and females cheat (but not maximally) if reports are associated with financial 
gains or losses, and iii) males and females do not cheat differentially.  
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1. Introduction 
There is mounting evidence on the factors that influence unethical behavior (Rosenbaum 
et al., 2014; Jacobsen et al. 2017). Our interest is to investigate how incentives to cheat vary along 
an observable dimension -- the person’s gender. Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest the existence 
of gender differences in preferences and highlight that males and females react differently to the 
context. Our aim is to see how these findings apply to cheating behavior when subjects have to 
report a piece of private information to the experimenter.  
We use the die-paradigm of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), where subjects roll a 
die privately and then report the outcome they allegedly obtained. We consider three different 
treatments. In the Baseline, the subjects’ payoffs are unaffected by their reported outcomes. In the 
Gain treatment, subjects’ reported outcomes determine the amount they receive in a sealed 
envelope at the end of the session. In the Loss treatment, subjects are announced the maximum 
earnings at the beginning of the session and their reports determine the amount to be deducted 
from their initial endowment. By comparing the reported outcomes with the expected (uniform) 
distribution, we can detect cheating at the aggregate level. We compare males’ and females’ 
reported outcomes within and across treatments to test for gender differences in cheating behavior 
and investigate whether or not males and females cheat differently in the Gain and Loss frame.  
Our study is the first to test for gender differences in cheating using the die-paradigm and 
considering separately the Gain and Loss domains. Childs (2012, 2013), Cappelen et al. (2013) 
and Grolleau et al. (2016), among others, investigate gender differences in cheating using other 
tasks. In the die-paradigm, the experimental evidence when reports are associated with gains is 
mixed; e.g., Clot et al. (2014) find that females cheat more than males, while Conrads et al. (2017) 
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find the opposite, and Muehlheusser et al. (2015) do not observe gender differences (see Abeler et 
al. (2016) for a recent meta-study on the die-paradigm).  
We contribute to the literature by reporting no gender differences in cheating and 
extending the discussion to the gain and loss domains. Loss aversion posits that it hurts more to 
lose what you already have rather than not gain something you never had. We do not detect, 
however, for fixed gender, any differences in cheating across the gain and loss frames, thus we do 
not find evidence of loss aversion for males and females. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment was added at the end of a session, following the procedures in Fischbacher 
and Follmi-Heusi (2013). Subjects were asked to roll a 10-sided die privately in their cubicles and 
then report the number they obtained (from 0 to 9) on the computer screen. Subjects received their 
payoffs at the end of the session in a sealed envelope depending on the reported outcome (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1: Payoffs (in Euros) per treatment depending on the reported number 
 
Reported outcome 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Baseline 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Gain  0 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Loss  -5 -4 -3.5 -3 -2.5 -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 
 
In the Baseline (43 males, 45 females), subjects received a fixed amount (2.5€), regardless 
of the reported outcome. In the Gain treatment (37 males, 52 females), earnings ranged between 
0€ (when reporting 0) and 5€ (when reporting 9). In the Loss treatment (32 males, 52 females), 
subjects were informed that they had been allocated 5€ at the beginning of the session. The 
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reported outcome determined the amount to be deducted (by the experimenter) from their 
envelope.  
 
3. Results 
 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the reported outcomes in each of the treatments, 
disaggregated by gender. The horizontal red line indicates the expected frequency if reports 
followed the theoretical uniform distribution.  
 
  Figure 1: Distribution of reported outcomes per treatment disaggregated by gender. 
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We reach our preferred specification following the marginality principle (Nelder, 1972; 
Weisberg, 2014, p. 139). We start with a regression model that includes a three-way interaction of 
the treatment, gender and age, and all lower level two-way interactions, and all main effects.  Our 
data suggest to eliminate the three-way (p = 0.383) and the two-way interactions (p = 0.250). We 
also eliminate the quadratic in age (p = 0.493).  
Table 1 reports the estimates of our final specification. We standardize the outcome, i.e., 
we subtract the theoretical expected value of the die roll outcome (4.5), and divide by the 
theoretical standard deviation of the die outcome (2.872). Our model is saturated by omitting the 
constant term and including a full set of indicator variables taking the value of one if the 
observation falls within one of the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. The estimated 
parameters have the interpretation of amount of cheating that takes place in the category flagged 
by the given indicator expressed in units of standard deviation. The test statistics are computed 
with Eicker-White robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity covariance matrix. This is necessary 
because our dependent variable has limited range (integers from 0 to 9).   
 
Table 1: Standardized Die Outcome: Linear regression. 
 
Regressor is an indicator for: b t-stat p-value 
Female & Baseline 0.182 1.29 (0.199) 
Male & Baseline 0.150 0.94 (0.350) 
Female & Gain 0.670*** 5.90 (0.000) 
Male & Gain 0.550*** 3.41 (0.001) 
Female & Loss 0.502*** 3.74 (0.000) 
Male & Loss 0.751*** 4.98 (0.000) 
R2 0.055   
N 261   
 
Notes. Dependent Variable is Standardized Die Outcome, (Die Outcome – Theoretical Expectation of Die Outcome)/(Theoretical 
Standard Deviation of Die Outcome) = (Die Outcome – 4.5)/ 2.872. Interpretation of the b coefficients is, e.g., in the Male & Loss 
treatment category the observed average die outcome is 0.751 of one theoretical standard deviation above the theoretical expected 
die outcome.  
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We find that males and females do not cheat in the Baseline (p > 0.199), but they do it in 
the Gain and the Loss treatments (p < 0.001) (see Table 1).  Both males and females over-report 
high numbers in these treatments (e.g., 7, 8 and 9 are reported more than 50% of the times), but 
there is no single large spike at the payoff-maximizing outcome, indicating that subjects refrain 
from cheating maximally (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013, Abeler et al. 2016). 
 
Result 1. a) There is no evidence of cheating behavior in the Baseline for males and 
females; b) Both males and females cheat (but not maximally) in Gain and Loss frames. 
 
We use the estimated regression in Table 1 to test for gender differences. Table 2 
summarizes our results for a fixed treatment (Panel A) and a fixed gender (Panel B).  
Panel A indicates that the magnitudes of the gender differences in cheating are very small; 
the largest gender difference is in the Loss treatment, where males cheat ¼ of a standard deviation 
more than females. Statistically, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that males and females report 
the same outcomes in each treatment separately (p > 0.219). We also fail to reject the null that 
males and females report the same outcomes if we test for gender difference for the three 
treatments jointly (p > 0.593). 
Table 2. Gender differences in cheating behavior 
Panel A. Cheating behavior across gender (holding the treatment fixed). 
 
 Value F-stat p-value 
1. Baseline: Female − Male 0.03 0.02 (0.881) 
2. Gain: Female − Male  0.12 0.36 (0.546) 
3. Loss: Female − Male   -0.25 1.52 (0.219) 
    
1. & 2. & 3. F(3,255)   0.64 (0.593) 
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Panel B. Cheating behavior across treatments (holding the gender fixed). 
 Males Females 
 Value F-stat p-value Value F-stat p-value 
1. Gain − Baseline 0.401* 3.12 (0.079) 0.488*** 7.25 (0.008) 
2. Loss − Baseline 0.601*** 7.49 (0.007) 0.320* 2.71 (0.101) 
3. Loss − Gain 0.200 0.82 (0.365) -0.167 0.91 (0.342) 
       
1. & 2. F(2,255)   3.83 (0.023)  3.64 (0.028) 
 
Notes. Values are in units of standard deviations; e.g., Panel A indicates that in the Loss treatment, males report 0.25 of a 
theoretical standard deviation higher outcomes than females. F-stat is for the null hypothesis Ho: Value=0. Last row of Panel B test 
whether Gain – Baseline and Loss – Baseline are equal to 0 jointly, which implies that Loss – Gain is equal to 0 too.  
 
In Panel B we find that males and females cheat more in Gain and Loss frames, compared 
to the Baseline (p < 0.101). Importantly, the size of the effects are bigger and range from 0.320 to 
0.601 of a standard deviation. Loss aversion would predict more cheating in the loss treatment, 
compared with the gain treatment. However, we do not find support for loss aversion in our task 
for males or females (p > 0.342).  It is possible that our design (where we simply change the 
reference point) is not enough to trigger loss aversion. One further explanation is that there is a 
moral cost of cheating (Mazar et al. 2008) and subjects do already cheat maximally in the Gain 
frame, thus the Loss frame cannot induce more cheating (Charness et al. 2017). At any event, our 
result is in line with recent articles that do not find evidence of loss aversion (Harinck et al. 2007, 
Gal and Rucker 2017).  
Result 2. Males and females cheat when they are incentivized to do so, that is in the Gain and 
Loss treatments. Within each frame, males and females do not cheat differently. We do not find 
evidence of loss aversion for males or females. 
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4. Conclusions 
We use the die-paradigm to study cheating behavior.  We find that both males and females 
cheat (but not maximally) in the presence of financial incentives; i.e., when reports are associated 
with financial gains or losses. We do not find support for loss aversion for males and females. 
When testing for gender differences, our data suggest no gender differences in cheating in the gain 
or the loss frames.  
In our experiment, the identity of the experimenter was never disclosed to subjects. All 
sessions were conducted in the presence of two research assistants: one male and one female. We 
believe that a fruitful area for future research would be looking at gender differences when 
subjects know the identity of the experimenter1; e.g., we can investigate whether males and/or 
females cheat more to males and/or females. 
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1 In a different context, Tan and Vogel (2008) show that indeed the behavior of subjects in the trust game change 
depending on with whom they are interacting--more religious trustees are trusted more, and this effect is more 
pronounced among more religious trusters. 
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